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"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, 
however, is to change it." So claims Karl Marx in the last line of his "Theses on 
Feuerbach."^ With this dictum Marx sets the stage for the historical unfolding of 
an international communist movement, a movement that Marx will crucially 
characterize in te rms of collecrive acrion: "WORKING MEN OF ALL 
COUNTRIES, UNITE!" Marx exhorts in the final line of "The Communist 
Manifesto."^ As such movements made their appearance on the horizon of global 
politics, however, subsequent Marxist artists and critics debated not only the fruitful 
possibilities, but also the potentially dire consequences invested in collective 
political action. In the article that follows, I want to trace a single strand of these 
debates, focusing particularly on the legacy of the Frankfurt School and its shifting 
commentary on the relations between political action and artistic practice. The 
frontispiece to my argument invokes the works of Walter Benjamin and Bertolt 
Brecht; writing in the shadow of the Second World War, both authors promote the 
use of art to foster revolutionary political programs—^the former with his view of 
history as a cycle of catastrophe requiring collective action for its cessation, the 
latter with his Lehrstucke or "Learning Plays" presented to promote such action. 
The centerpiece of my argument examines the work of Theodor Adomo and Heiner 
Millier, who chronicle the abuse of revolutionary fervor after the descent of the 
Iron Curtain over Europe; both voice suspicion over the call to collectivity endorsed 
by politically engaged art, a reticence that appears to preclude the employment of 
art in any collective political program. As an afterpiece to my argument, however, 
I note that the end of the Cold War and the ensuing triumph of global capital 
demands a reconception of art and politics—a project that acquires a new urgency 
now that the cycle of catastrophe theorized by Benjamin visits violence on first 
and third worlds alike; I look to the World Wide Web—a virtual terrain nurtured 
by global capital itself—as a site for an intersection of art and politics that maintains 
the possibility of collective action even under the regime of the New World Order. 
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In his famous 1940 text "Theses on the Philosophy of History," Walter 
Benjamin describes the course of history as an eternal recxurence of disaster; writing 
during his exile in Paris after the Nazi seizure of power in his native Germany, 
Benjamin responds to the rise of Fascism in Europe by opining that this cycle of 
catastrophe will end only through a form of revolutionary messianic intervention, 
a divinely inspired insight into earthly affairs that will rend the fabric of history 
and thereby incite the proletariat to collective action. Contrary to the common 
notion of history as a series of steps toward the progressive perfection of civilization, 
Benjamin views history as an endless repetition of atrocities: "The tradition of the 
oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the 
exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping 
with this insight."^ The task of the historian, therefore, is to rescue the fleeting 
moments of the past before they fall victim to the illusion of historical progress: 
"The past," claims Benjamin, "can be seized only as an image which flashes up at 
the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again.'"^ For Benjamin, this 
seizure of the past—itself characteristic of the divine view of history—offers the 
only chance to expose history as eternal recurrence, to shock the masses out of 
their complacency and inspire them to create a future free of domination: "The 
awareness that they are about to make the continuum of history explode is 
characteristic of the revolutionary classes at the moment of their action."^ 
Like Benjamin, the playwright Bertolt Brecht also advocated the incitement 
of the masses to collective action; his Lehrstucke or "Learning Plays" were designed 
to provide the proletariat with a flash of insight into the past and thus with a new 
vision of the future. To be sure, the Lehrstucke were written in a more optimistic 
era than the "Theses" of Benjamin: the former was composed shortly before the 
suicide of its author during the Nazi occupation of France and reads as a desperate 
attempt to preserve hope in revolutionary action; the former, however, were 
composed during the heady days of the Weimar Republic, when such action 
appeared imminent and artists like Brecht oriented their works to revolutionary 
ends. In the 1930 Lehrstuck The Measures Taken, for instance, Brecht champions 
collective political activity over the limited action available to the individual; here 
the death of a yornig Party worker is depicted as a sacrifice for the glorious revolution 
to come. The play takes place before a Party Tribunal—an adjudicating body 
portrayed by a Chorus of performers. As the play begins, four Party Agitators step 
forward and announce to the Tribunal that they have murdered a comrade in arms 
and tossed his body into a lime pit; the Agitators implore the Tribunal to forgive 
their crime, and the play unfolds as they relate the events that led to the murder. 
The Agitators begin their story with their arrival in the Chinese city of Mukden, 
where they were assigned to foment rebellion by educating the masses in the 
teachings of Communism. A youthful supporter of the revolution, called the Young 
Comrade in the text, agrees to serve as their guide, but before the group begins 
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their operations they are urged by the local Party Leader to hide their identities— 
an action indicated in performance by the donning of masks. The Agitators, 
therefore, sacrifice their individuality to the revolution; as the Party Leader informs 
the Agitators: "You are not Karl Schmitt from Berlin, you are not Anna Kjersk 
from Kazan, and you are not Peter Sawitch fi-om Moscow. All of you are nameless 
and motherless, blank pages on which the Revolution writes its instructions."^ 
As the Agitators commence their activities, however, they realize that the Young 
Comrade cannot view his fellow countr3mien as "nameless and motherless" figures 
in a larger collective. The Comrade thus commits a series of rash actions designed 
to alleviate individual suffering; such actions, however, merely threaten to expose 
the Agitators, who spirit the Young Comrade from the city. At last concluding that 
their only hope to escape detection is to shoot their Comrade, the Agitators ask 
their companion to consent to his own death—^to sacrifice himself for the revolution. 
The Young Comrade agrees to his execution, and in the fmal scene of the play the 
Agitators justify their actions to the Tribunal: 
IT IS A FEARSOME THING TO KILL 
But we will kill ourselves and not just others if necessary 
Since only by force can this dying world be changed 
As every living man knows. 
It is not granted to us, we said, 
Not to kill. 
At one with the unflexible will to change the world 
We formulated 
The measures to be taken.^ 
As the play draws to an end, the Tribunal delivers its verdict and exonerates the 
Agitators of their deeds; as the Chorus comments, the death of a single individual— 
hiOwever lamentable—cannot be allowed to impede the impending revolution: 
Your work was successful 
You have spread 
The teachings of the classics 
The ABC of communism: 
To the ignorant, instruction about their situation 
To the oppressed, class consciousness 
And to the class conscious, the experience of revolution. 
In yet another country the revolution advances 
In another land the ranks of fighters are joined 
We agree to what you have done.^ 
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In The Measures Taken, then, Brecht advocates collective political action even 
if such action results in the death of individual subjects; only through the 
mobilization of the masses will the anticipated revolution take place. Significantly, 
such faith in the efficacy of collective action is suggested not only in the plays of 
Brecht, but also in the commentary on his plays by Benjamin, an ardent supporter 
of his work. In his 1939 essay "What is Epic Theatre?" Benjamin details a number 
of Brecht's theatrical innovations, all of which are geared toward the promotion of 
collective political action among the audience. Perhaps the foremost effect of epic 
style is the evocation of a certain "surprise" or "shock" within the spectators— 
shock at the fact that oppressive social circumstances, usually taken for granted, 
continue to exist to the present day: "The art of epic theatre consists in producing 
astonishment rather than empathy. To put it succinctly: instead of identifying with 
the characters, the audience should be educated to be astonished at the circumstances 
under which they fimction."^ This shock to the system exposes history as a cycle 
of catastrophe, one that will incite the individual to break the cycle through 
revolutionary activity. Significantly, however, according to Benjamin this individual 
awakening always entailed participation in collective action; observing that viewers 
of the Lehrstucke frequently played roles in the productions, Benjamin remarks 
that this participation was designed to instill a collective spirit among the spectators. 
Benjamin comments further upon this participatory theatre by noting its effects 
upon the performance space. For Benjamin, the orchestra pit that separates the 
performer from the spectator has become an abyss that prevents audience 
participation; epic theatre strives to eliminate this barrier: "This abyss, of all 
elements of theatre the one that bears the most indelible traces of its ritual origin, 
has steadily decreased in significance. The stage is still raised, but it no longer 
rises from an infathomable depth; it has become a dais. The didactic play and the 
epic theatre are attempts to sit down on a dais."^^ 
By the time Benjamin composed his "Epic Theatre" essay in 1939, however, 
the hopes for an imminent revolution had been dashed—at least in Germany; the 
advent of the Second World War confirmed his view of history as an etemal 
recurrence of disaster, a theme likewise elaborated by his Frankfurt School 
colleagues Theodor Adomo and Max Horkheimer in their landmark 1944 text 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. Like Benjamin, Adomo and Horkheimer place their 
faith in a flash of inspiration that will illuminate history; crucially, however, the 
pair argue that the revolution it incites must be cognitive rather than political, for 
in their view any attempt at collective political action seemed doomed to collapse 
into the very barbarism it seeks to overcome. Adomo and Horkheimer define the 
enlightenment as the attempt of the individual to differentiate itself firom the swampy 
morass of a nature that engulfs it; for this task the individual employs reason, 
which subjects nature to the force of will: "The system that the enlightenment has 
in mind is the form of knowledge which copes most proficiently with the facts and 
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supports the individual most efFectively in the mastery of nature. Its principles are 
the principles of self-preservation."^ ^ Problems arise, however, when the dynamic 
force of reason freezes into static concepts; the instrumental application of such 
concepts promotes the collapse of subjects into a mass identification that perfectly 
replicates the morass of nature itself: "Everything—even the human individual, 
not to speak of the animal—is converted into a repeatable, replaceable process, 
into a mere example for the conceptual models of the system."^^ Thus rather than 
fostering a reconciliation of the subject with nature, the enlightenment project 
devolves into a series of despotic regimes that return the subject to a state of nature 
by subsuming the individual into a mass collective: "Through the mediation of the 
total society which embraces all relations and emotions, men are once again made 
to be that against which the evolutionary law of society, the principle of self, had 
turned: mere species beings, exactly like one another through isolation in forcibly 
united collectivity."*^ 
Despite the gloomy tenor of their text, however, Adomo and Horkheimer 
preserve hope for a final rapprochement of individual and collective, which would 
occur not through the ossification of thought that collapses the former into the 
latter, but instead through renewed attention to the unfolding of thought that 
imbricates the former within the latter. This unfolding, in other words, would 
promote a continual movement of individual thought through collective cognitive 
stmctures, rather than its entropie decline into stasis with those stmctures. Such a 
movement would then precipitate a cognizance of history as a cycle of catastrope, 
overtuming ossified notions of historical progress that blind the subject to its total 
subsumption by the masses and thereby impede their mutual reconciliation. Such 
an overtuming of history is evident in the 1970 Heiner Millier play Mauser, a 
reworking of The Measures Taken that exposes the betrayal of revolutionary action 
behind the Iron Curtain; here revolution is portrayed not as a glorious tuming 
point in history, but instead as an endless reign of violence that enslaves the very 
subjects it attempts to liberate. Much like its antecedent, Mauser is dominated by 
a collective Chorus—in this case a Tribunal that sentences enemies of the Revolution 
to their deaths. As the play opens, the Chorus addresses its own executioner, who 
now ironically faces execution in his tum. This figure, identified only as "A" by 
the text, had assumed the role of executioner when the previous bearer of the title— 
called "B" by the text—objected to the performance of his office; as " B " remarks: 
"Why the killing and why the dying / If the price of the Revolution is the Revolution 
/ Those to be freed the price of freedom?"'"* An ardent supporter of the Revolution, 
"A" is dispatched to execute " B " and inherits his office, yet for "A" as well a 
suspicion of barbarism soon arises from the scene of human suffering: 
. . . I spoke the command 
This morning just as in the first morning 
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DEATH TO THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION 
And dispensed death, yet my voice !^  
Spoke the command like it wasn't my voice and my hand 
Dispensed death like it wasn't my hand. 
Chastised by the Tribunal for his anti-revolutionary sentiments, "A" retums 
to his grisly duties, but is eventually overwhelmed by the task at hand and mutilates 
the corpses in a frenzy of violence; the Tribunal notes: 
After he had shot again and again ' 
Through the bursting skin into the bloody 
Flesh, at cracking bones, he voted ; 
with his feet against the corpse. i 
The Tribunal condemns his actions, stating that the dignity of the individual— 
even an enemy of the revolution—constitutes the very presupposition of the 
revolution itself: 
But when your hand became one with the revolver 
And you became one with your work r 
And had lost any consciousness of it v 
That it had to be done here and now 
So that it won't have to be done any more and by no one 
Your place at our front became a gap 
And no place for you at our front any longer. ' 
A cruel irony, therefore, emerges as the Tribunal upholds human dignity while 
simultaneously effacing it; bewildered by this paradox and its perpetuation of the 
regimen of violence, "A" at last consents to his death and even gives the signal for 
his own execution: 
. . . and he didn't ask any more 
But went to the wall and spoke the command 
Knowing, the daily bread of the Revolution 
Is the death of its enemies, knowing even the grass 
We must tear up so it will stay green. 
DEATH TO THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION. 
Written a year after the death of Adomo in 1969, Mauser embodies his suspicion 
of collective action; indeed, the play seems to embody his engagement with 
contemporary art itself, particularly in its relation to political activity. For Adomo, 
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art appears as a crystallized moment of thought that, despite its frozen status, 
manages to gesture toward its freedom. Crucially, however, the use of art for 
specifically political ends tends to stifle this gesture. In his 1961 essay 
"Commitment," Adomo argues that any call to political action operates in a sphere 
of cognition at least implicitly endorsed by the prevailing political system; even 
the most subversive artworks are, therefore, complicit with the status quo. Adomo 
accordingly distrusts the projects of artists like Brecht, for such appeals to collective 
action involve an administration of individual thought that echoes the strategies of 
the current political regime. Specifically addressing The Measures Taken, Adomo 
claims that the justification of murder that it offers merely replicates the cycle of 
catastrophe initiated by the logic of capitalism—in this case applied to the very 
movement that attempts to dismantle it: "The wild roar of The Measures Taken 
drowns out the noise of the disaster that has overtaken the cause, which Brecht 
convulsively tries to proclaim as salvation. Even Brecht's best work was infected 
by the deceptions of his commitment."'^ Political investment, therefore, debases 
art, which in the overwhelmingly administered world of Cold War politics can 
maintain its integrity only by refusing to engage that world. To be sure, every 
artwork must make its appearance within the reality from which it seeks to distance 
itself, for every individual thought is always embedded within collective cognition. 
In seeking its freedom, however, the artwork signals the desire of the individual to 
refuse the lockstep of the collective; given the increasing administration of the 
worid, this refusal preserves the only hope for an ultimate integration of individual 
and collective. For Adomo, then, a tmly effective artwork promotes political 
freedom precisely by refusing any political program: "Even in the most sublimated 
work of art there is a hidden 'it should be otherwise. ' . . . As eminently constructed 
and produced objects, works of art, including literary ones, point to a practice from 
which they abstain: the creation of a just life."^° 
The contemporary art promoted by Adomo thus offers a challenge to the 
ossification of thought through attention to its potential for unfolding; such artworks 
provide an altemative to those manufactured under totalitarian regimes, which 
grant the subject a specious sense of liberation even as they guide that subject to 
blind acceptance of its domination. Certainly with Mauser, Miiller condemns such 
ossification of thought, suggesting that the GDR regime, ostensibly devoted to 
freeing the subject from its enslavement by capital, has fallen victim to the same 
instmmentality that plagues capitalism itself; here revolution has collapsed into 
eternal recurrence of domination, and thus its promise of liberation is endlessly 
deferred.^' This deferral is perhaps best embodied by the consent of "A" to his 
own execution; the ossification of thought that transforms liberation into domination 
is made manifest when "A" relinquishes his individual existence and willingly 
joins the collective ranks of the slaughtered dead. Curiously, however, despite its 
cautionary content, Mauser itself seems to risk falling into ossification, specifically 
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through its reference to the Lehrstucke form. In a series of stage directions that 
accompany the play, Muller notes that any viable production of Mauser requires 
the participation of its spectators: "Performance for an audience is possible if the 
audience is invited to control the performance by its text, and the text by its 
performance, through reading the Chorus part, or the part of the First Player ("A"), 
or if the Chorus is read by one group of spectators and the First Player by another 
group of spectators."^^ With Mauser, then, Muller recalls not only the narrative 
content of The Measures Taken, but also its participatory form—^the same form 
that Brecht used to incite viewers to mass political action. At first glance, therefore, 
the text seems to war against itself, as the communal spirit that it fosters contradicts 
the very waming that it issues. 
Muller adds a twist to the audience participation employed by Brecht, however, 
for this participation appears to signal not a subsumption of the individual into the 
collective, but on the contrary a desire to refuse such subsumption. Muller continues 
his stage directions by remarking that audience participation must be predicated 
on "the non-synchronism of text and performance, the non-identity of speaker and 
performer. In other words, Muller recommends a certain doubling of the several 
roles in the text, with one participant speaking the lines of a given role and another 
doubling that role through embodied gesture. Crucially, these doublings suggest a 
shifting relationship between the individual figure "A" and the collective Choms; 
the Choms may double "A" or, conversely, "A" may double the Choms. Muller, 
in fact, lists several strategies for achieving this doubling effect: "The Choms 
provides to the First Performer ("A") for certain speeches a performer of the First 
Performer ("Al "); all Choms performers either at once or one after another perform 
the part of the First Performer; the First Performer speaks certain segments of the 
Choms speeches while " A l " performs his role."^"^ This oscillating position of the 
individual vis-à-vis the collective Choms suggests the desire of the single subject 
to escape the gravitational pull of the masses—its continuing search for freedom 
of voice, freedom of action, freedom of thought. Thus even in its depiction of 
history as a cycle of catastrophe, Mauser encapsulates the desire for the liberation 
of thought, one that maintains hope for the ultimate rapprochement of individual 
and collective; here thought would appear not as a series of static concepts that 
inevitably propel the subject into mindless mass identity, but as a dynamic unfolding 
that signals the mutual imbrication of the subject and the greater social stmcture. 
Thus while Mauser depicts the deadly effects of ossified thought, it also invokes 
the radical potential of its continual unfolding, preserving the political promise of 
The Measures Taken and the entire Lehrstucke tradition by overturning its basic 
presuppositions. Such an approach to art is in fact advocated by Adomo himself 
In his essay "On Tradition," Adomo argues that a play like Mauser may carve out 
a free space for thought on the basis of its critical relation to an earlier artistic 
tradition. Adomo identifies a polarizing tendency in twentieth-century artistic 
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production vis-à-vis the traditions of the past: while some artists and critics align 
themselves with tradition in the name of eternal or absolute values, others depart 
from tradition in favor of movements that spring, as it were, from the head of Zeus. 
For Adomo, both of these positions merely reinforce the power of the status quo, 
for both necessitate an irresponsible form of forgetting. On the one hand, the 
deliberate rejection or forgetting of tradition is commensurate with the forgetting 
of past injustices—an unconscionable crime. On the other hand, however, the 
rigid adherence to tradition also enacts a form of forgetting, for the mere reiteration 
of the past inevitably effaces the painful memories embedded in it: "To insist on 
the absolute absence of tradition is as naive as the obstinate insistence on it. Both 
are ignorant of the past that persists in their allegedly pure relation to objects; both 
are unaware of the dust and debris that clouds their allegedly clear vision."^^ 
As opposed to either of these two approaches, Adomo maintains that a 
conscious negation of tradition is the only means to preserve its insight into the 
past for use in the amelioration of the present. For Adomo, the artwork must 
paradoxically refute tradition as a rigidified relic of the status quo, while 
simultaneously referencing that tradition as the very source of its emergence; as 
Adomo states in the conclusion to his essay: "Whoever seeks to avoid betraying 
the bliss which tradition still promises in some of its images and the possibilities 
buried beneath its mins must abandon that tradition which turns possibilities and 
meanings into lies. Only that which inexorably denies tradition may once again 
retrieve it."^^ Following Adomo, I would argue that Mauser attempts to recapture 
the blissful promise of its antecedent by relinquishing that promise the moment 
that its fulfillment is revealed as a failure. In other words, the element of hope 
within the text emerges from its simultaneous thematizarion and problematization 
of tradition; the play provides a fleeting glimpse of the Utopian revolutionary 
moment, even as that moment emerges from the dystopian vision of ongoing 
revolutionary calamity. Mauser thus upholds the valuable insight of Adomo and 
Horkheimer that the eternal recurrence of history is apprehended only through the 
continual unfolding of thought itself In overtuming the history of revolution, 
Mauser likewise suggests an overtuming of the history of thought; only this could 
do justice to the tradition of revolution it has inherited. 
Adomo, to be sure, wrote most of his important texts at the height of the Cold 
War, and his response to the global battle of ideology was to promote a freedom of 
thought that could resist rigidified political positions. Significantly, however, the 
end of the Cold War and the seeming triumph of capitalism suggests that the time 
is ripe to rethink this response; while the collapse of Soviet power spurred 
democratic advances in some parts of the globe, the political domination and 
economic exploitation of the Third World by the First has continued unchallenged 
by systematic intemational resistance. What political program could recognize 
that the triumph of capital precipitates another tum in the cycle of catastrophe, and 
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how could it preserve the hope for revolution? Of course, Adomo refused to 
advocate any political program, arguing that individual freedom is degraded by 
the collective stmcture of political action. Recalling his own reflections on tradition, 
however, I maintain that the most effective way to uphold the legacy of Adomo is 
through a revolutionary overtuming of his precepts. Might one conceive a political 
program that actually promotes individual freedom within its collective stmcture, 
and how might art participate in this program? The radical art collective Critical 
Art Ensemble or CAE has recently addressed such questions; like Adomo, CAE 
endorses an art that preserves individual freedom, but unlike Adomo CAE does 
not seek the isolation of art from the political sphere.^^ CAE argues that art can no 
longer be viewed as a crystallization of thought that somehow gestures toward its 
liberation; for CAE, no such crystallized thought could contain this gesture, for 
global capital now monumentalizes every work of art by assigning it a position 
within its code of value: "In the end, monuments, even ones created with radical 
intentions, reinforce the status quo by reinforcing the audiences' disposition for 
visual ingestion of rigid codes and stereotypes."^^ CAE thus views art not as a 
crystallized moment of thought but as the unfolding of thought itself, and the 
freedom of thought it promises lies not in a refusal of politics, but in an always 
shifting engagement with politics. Calling its shifting practice nomad art, CAE 
observes that "the voice of the nomadic cultural worker insinuates itself into a 
given situation at a given moment, only to dissipate in the next."^^ Nomad art, 
therefore, posits a space of individual freedom that exists both within and without 
the collective stmcture, and it is within this space that the possibility exists for 
dynamic artistic action: "Nomadic action occurs in the spatial cracks that separate 
the forces of micromanagement, and in the temporal gaps between autonomous 
action and punishment, because it is in this liminal location where the possibility 
for dialogic cultural action is fbund."^^ 
This new vision of art as nomadic action suggests a search for a new field of 
resistant artistic practice; while such a field is never free from complicity with the 
regime of capital, it nonetheless offers occasion to call attention to the contradictions 
lodged within the regime itself. The World Wide Web, for instance, may seem an 
unlikely venue for resistant art, given its thorough imbrication in the networks of 
global capital. Recently, however, a widely circulated exchange between Nike 
Corporation and an individual consumer demonstrated how such an exchange could 
constitute not only a form of resistant political practice, but also a form of nomad 
art; a closer examination of the exchange will reveal both its political and artistic 
implications. Nike offers an online service called NIKE iD that allows consumers 
to personalize their shoes through the addition of a word or phrase stitched 
undemeath the Nike corporate logo. Jonah Peretti, a graduate student at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wished to utilize this service to call attention 
to forgotten labor invested in the production of Nike products; Peretti sent the 
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requisite $50 for the service and requested that Nike add the word "sweatshop" to 
his pair of shoes. Nike quickly responded with an email refhsing Perretti's request: 
Your NIKE iD order was cancelled for one of the following reasons: 
1 ) Your Personal iD contains another party's trademark or other intellectual 
property. 
2) Your personal iD contains the name of an athlete or team we do not 
have the legal right to use. 
3) Your Personal iD was left blank. Did you not want any personalization? 
4) Your Personal iD contains profanity or inappropriate slang, and besides, 
your mother would slap us.^' 
Undeterred, Perretti replied to Nike by refiiting the four reasons given for the 
cancellation of his order. The email from Perretti reads, in part, as follows: 
The Personal iD on my custom ZOOM XC USA running shoes was the 
word "sweatshop." Sweatshop is not: 
1) Another party's trademark, 
2) The name of an athlete, 
3)Blank,or 
4) Profanity. 
I chose the iD because I wanted to remember the toil and labor of the 
children that made my shoes. Could you please ship them to me 
immediately?^^ 
Increasingly anxious to justify the refusal of Perretti's request, Nike responded 
by noting that "your NIKE iD order was cancelled because the iD you have chosen 
contains, as stated in the previous email correspondence, inappropriate slang."^^ 
Again, Perretti replied by refuting the argument offered by Nike. His email read, 
in part: "After consulting Webster's Dictionary, I discovered that 'sweatshop' is in 
fact part of standard English, and not slang. The word means: 'a shop or factory 
in which workers are employed for long hours at low wages and under unhealthy 
conditions' and its origin dates from 1892."'^^ 
Nike was finally forced to invoke the legal jargon installed upon its website, 
presumably placed there for exigencies like these; the final response from Nike 
cites its own "rules for personalization" to the effect that "Nike reserves the right 
to cancel any personal iD up to 24 hours after it has been submitted."^^ The email 
then notes that some iD requests "may contain material that we consider 
pappropriate or simply do not wish to place on our products," then concludes with 
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a bald refusal of Perretti's request: "With these rules in mind, we cannot accept 
your order as submitted. If you wish to reorder your NIKE iD product with a new 
personalization, please visit us again at www.nike.com."^^ As an ironic capstone 
to the exchange, Perrett i at last concedes defeat, only to make another 
"inappropriate" addition to his order: "Thank you for the time and energy you 
have spent on my request. I have decided to order shoes with a different iD, but I 
would like to make one small request. Could you please send me a color snapshot 
of the ten year old Vietnamese girl who makes my shoes?"^*^ 
Realizing that his encounter with Nike usefully exposed the deliberate 
obfuscation of its corporate labor practices, Perretti forwarded the email exchange 
to his circle of friends; each friend in tum forwarded the exchange to others, and 
soon the story traversed the globe, reaching untold numbers of readers through 
networks of email correspondence. As a student of Media Studies, Perretti himself 
is able to offer an astute analysis of the email exchange, its global dissemination, 
and its political repercussions. In an April 9, 2001 article for The Nation, Perretti 
notes that while giant corporations like Nike exploit powerfixl mass media outlets 
to promote their products, micromedia outlets such as email networks are in fact 
capable of challenging corporate promotional strategies: "It takes so little effort 
for each person to pass the message to multiple recipients that an idea can almost 
seem to be spreading on its own, like a self-replicating vims."^^ Moreover, these 
email exchanges not only constitute forms of political practice, but forms of nomad 
art as well, inasmuch as they maintain a space of individual freedom within a 
collective stmcture. Consider that a recipient of the Perretti email may decide to 
contact Nike in order to request a similarly subversive personal iD. Here, there is 
a danger that such acts may congeal into a mass response that resembles the mass 
marketing strategy it seeks to overtum; if all recipients requested the "sweatshop" 
logo, the request would lose its force. The format of the exchange, however, allows 
the activities it engenders to proliferate in multiple and unanticipated ways, enabling 
recipients to stage individual interventions under the aegis of a collective response: 
Each recipient, for instance, may request a different logo from Nike and thereby 
challenge any evasive maneuver the company makes. Perretti, therefore, concludes 
his article by noting the dismptive potential of such responses. Indeed, the activities 
promoted by the article may suggest a new conception of revolutionary action 
itself "The dynamics of decentralized distribution systems and peer to peer networks 
are as counterintuitive as they are powerful. By understanding these dynamics, 
new forms of social protest become possible, with the potential to challenge some 
of the constellations of power traditionally supported by the mass media."^^ 
What forms might this reconceived revolutionary action take? Cmcially, this 
action would not promote a rigidly ideological, political program that tends to 
subsume individuals into a mindless collective. Nor would this action preserve 
individual freedom by eschewing collective political programs altogether. Rather, 
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revolutionary action would consist of shifting political struggles that seek the 
liberation of the individual within the collective sphere itself Meanwhile, those 
artists and critics aligned with the new revolutionary project can take a history 
lesson from their forebears, maintaining the revolutionary promise of their work 
by overtuming their basic presuppositions. This revolutionary art would not be 
the art of Brecht and Benjamin—a flash of individual inspiration that incites a 
collective tuming point in history. Neither would it be the art of Miiller and 
Adomo—a crystallization of individual thought that refuses the collective lockstep 
of the masses. The work of Perretti and CAE, however, goes some distance toward 
conceiving a new revolutionary art, one that will embody the unfolding of thought 
in an ongoing process at once individual and collective. The processual nature of 
this art will encourage the overtuming of ossified views of history as progress or 
development, allowing art to resist regimes of domination while also resisting a 
fall into the very strategies of domination that it challenges. Such an art, to be 
sure, would respond to the political demands of the day and will inevitably fall 
into obsolescence in its tum. Yet it would seem to offer an altemative to the new 
jingoism of the United States and the rest of the developed world as it faces the 
recent escalation of global terrorist attacks. Here history indeed appears as etemal 
recurrence, the cyclical emptions of violence representing the repercussions of 
foreign policies predicated on manipulation and strong arm tactics. Against this 
backdrop of global exploitation, on the one hand, and the threat of global terror, on 
the other, I argue that the need for new forms of revolutionary artistic and political 
practice have attained a new urgency. While the dream of such a practice seems 
dim indeed, I maintain that the ability to "think otherwise" holds hope for a future 
in which we may "live otherwise," a future founded upon the continued freedom 
of thought itself 
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